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  1 
The Role of Career and Wage Incentives in Labor Productivity:  
Evidence from a Two-stage Field Experiment in Malawi1 
 
Hyuncheol Bryant Kim2, Seonghoon Kim3, and Thomas T. Kim4 
15 June 2019 
 
Abstract 
We study how career and wage incentives affect labor productivity through self-selection and 
incentive effect channels using a two-stage field experiment in Malawi. First, recent secondary 
school graduates were hired with either career or wage incentives. After employment, a half of 
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workers with career incentives randomly received wage incentives, and a half of workers with 
wage incentives randomly received career incentives. Career incentives attract higher-performing 
workers than wage incentives, but do not increase productivity conditional on selection. Wage 
incentives increase productivity for those recruited through career incentives. Observable 
characteristics are limited in explaining selection effects of entry-level workers.  
Keywords: Career Incentive, Wage Incentive, Internship, Self-selection, Labor Productivity 
JEL Classification: J30, O15, M52 
 
1. Introduction 
Work incentives are essential tools to improve labor productivity. Firms try to recruit 
productive workers and motivate existing employees to exert more effort through work incentives. 
Career incentives (tenure and promotion) and financial incentives (higher wage, cash bonus, and 
employee stock option) are common examples of work incentives. There are two channels through 
which work incentives can affect labor productivity: selection and incentive effects.5 A better 
understanding of how different incentives affect labor productivity would enable firms to design 
optimal hiring and compensation strategies that maximize labor productivity and reduce the need 
for costly screening processes.  
We provide experimental evidence on how career and wage incentives affect labor 
productivity through self-selection and incentive effect channels. We conduct a two-stage 
                                                     
5  The incentive effect refers to the difference in labor productivity when incentives affect 
performance holding employee composition constant. The selection effect refers to the difference 
in labor productivity driven by workers’ self-selection into the job. 
00854
9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS.
rest
by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
  Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  3 
randomized controlled trial to separately isolate the selection and incentive effects of these 
incentives in collaboration with Africa Future Foundation (AFF), an international non-
governmental organization (NGO), in the context of a recruitment drive for entry-level 
enumerators for a population census survey in rural Malawi. 
The career incentives we study consist of a future job prospect and a recommendation letter, 
which are typical benefits of an internship position. 6  The wage incentives in our study are 
composed of a lump-sum salary and performance-related bonus payment. Firms might expect that 
career incentives attract workers more forward-looking and/or risk-loving than others because an 
internship position implies taking the risk of not being employed at the end of the internship. On 
the other hand, firms might expect that wage incentives attract workers more extrinsically 
motivated by monetary compensation. 
Our research setting, the recruitment of entry-level enumerators in Malawi, is suitable to 
study the role of work incentives in productivity because we are able to measure high frequency 
individual-level labor productivity. The nature of an enumerator job is multidimensional because 
enumerators are expected to conduct interviews both quickly and accurately. Thus, we measure 
job performance by the number of surveys conducted per day (survey quantity) and the proportion 
of errors/mistakes made in a survey (survey quality). In addition, our setting has advantages to 
study the role of work incentives especially in worker self-selection. Worker screening in 
                                                     
6 An internship is a temporary position that can be paid or unpaid, and is distinguished from a 
short-term job in that it emphasizes on-the-job training for students or entry-level workers. 
Internship programs are widely available in Malawi in the public, private, and NGO sectors. For 
example, about 20% of regular workers in AFF are hired through the internship program. 
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developing countries is difficult because observable information on worker skills such as 
certification, accreditation, and the past work history are limited. It is even more challenging to 
observe the productivity of entry-level workers due to no or short work history.  
To hire enumerators, AFF approached 440 randomly selected recent high school graduates 
in its project areas. As shown in Figure 1, in the first stage, study subjects were randomly assigned 
to one of the two groups: (i) those who received a job offer with career incentives (hereafter the 
Internship group) and (ii) those who received a job offer with wage incentives (hereafter the Wage 
group). Those assigned to the Internship group received an internship opportunity that comes with 
(a) a potential long-term employment opportunity at AFF as a regular employee and (b) a 
recommendation letter specifying their job performance.7 A one-time temporary work opportunity 
with a lump-sum wage and a bonus payment based on job performance was offered to those 
assigned to the Wage group. 
Individuals who accepted the job opportunity in the first stage proceeded to enumerator 
training and the second-stage randomization. After completing the training, a randomly selected 
half of the job takers in the Internship group additionally received the same wage incentives of the 
Wage group without prior notice. In the same manner, a randomly selected half of the job takers 
in the Wage group additionally received the same career incentives of the Internship group without 
                                                     
7 An entry-level regular position (enumerator or data entry clerk) at AFF has career advancement 
prospects that lead to more advanced positions. AFF did not explicitly state the actual probability 
of being hired to the Internship group. We acknowledge that changing probabilities of being hired 
after the internship might affect effort levels, but we do not compare different levels of the same 
incentive, but rather two different types of incentives.  
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prior notice. As a result, this research design creates four sub-groups: Group 1 (G1) and Group 2 
(G2) became enumerators through career incentives, but only G2 received additional wage 
incentives. Similarly, Group 3 (G3) and Group 4 (G4) became enumerators through wage 
incentives, but only G3 received additional career incentives. 
We isolate the selection effect on labor productivity by comparing G2 and G3, both of 
which have identical incentives (both career and wage incentives) during the work period. 
However, the channels through which they were attracted to the job are different.8 Our identifying 
assumption of the selection effect is that sequences in which first-stage and second-stage incentives 
are presented to G2 and G3 participants are independent of the combined value of the career and 
wage incentives. This assumption is required both in the conceptual framework (Conceptual 
Framework Appendix A.2) and the empirical analysis (Section 4.3). We discuss the reliability of 
this assumption with further details in Section 4.3. 
In addition, we estimate the incentive effects of wage incentives (henceforth, wage 
incentive effects) on job performance among the job takers in the Internship group by comparing 
G1 and G2. Both groups became enumerators through the career incentives, but only G2 received 
additional wage incentives. Hence, any difference in performance between G1 and G2 can be 
interpreted as wage incentive effects among the job takers in the Internship group. Similarly, we 
estimate the incentive effects of career incentives (henceforth, career incentive effects) on job 
performance among the job takers in the Wage group by comparing G3 and G4. Any difference in 
                                                     
8  The comparison of G2 and G3 can be also interpreted as the selection effect of the wage 
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performance between G3 and G4 can be interpreted as career incentive effects among the job takers 
in the Wage group. 
Of 440 randomly selected recent male high school graduates whom AFF approached for 
the baseline survey of this study without prior notice of job opportunity, 362 (82.3%) participated 
in the baseline survey.9 Of 176 study participants assigned to the Wage group, 74 (42.0%) accepted 
a job offer by joining the training session. Of 186 study participants assigned to the Internship 
group, 74 (39.8%) took up the job offer. Of 148 trainees, 11 dropped out from the training. As a 
result, 137 enumerators worked in the field for an average of 18 days interviewing 21,561 
households.10 
We reach four main conclusions using data on labor productivity measured by survey 
quality and survey quantity. First, we find that career incentives, compared to wage incentives, 
attract workers with higher labor productivity through the self-selection mechanism. Second, we 
find that the incentive effects of career incentives among those recruited by wage incentives are 
                                                     
9 There were 536 eligible study subjects who were male and recent high school graduates in AFF’s 
project areas. Of the 536, AFF provided job offers to a randomly selected group of 440. The other 
96 subjects were also invited to participate in the baseline survey, although they did not receive a 
job offer. Individual characteristics and the balance between the two groups (440 vs. 96) are shown 
in Table A.1. 
10 Throughout this paper, target study participants refer to the 440 individuals who were invited 
to participate in the baseline survey, study participants refer to the 362 individuals who 
participated in the baseline survey; trainees (job takers) refer to the 148 individuals who joined 
the training; and enumerators refer to the 137 individuals who worked in the field.   
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limited in improving labor productivity. Third, we find that wage incentives causally increase labor 
productivity among those recruited through career incentives. As a result, overall job performance 
is highest among G2 enumerators who were hired through the career incentive channel and 
additionally received wage incentives. Lastly, we find that observable individual characteristics 
are limited in explaining the selection effect of entry-level workers, suggesting a limitation of 
screening based on observable characteristics and a need for a self-selection mechanism that can 
attract productive workers with desirable (unobserved) characteristics.  
Our primary contribution to the literature is that we study career and wage incentives, the 
most common types of work incentives, jointly in the same setting, and provide real-world 
evidence on how these incentives affect labor productivity by identifying the selection and 
incentive effect channels through two-stage randomization.  
Previous studies estimating the selection and incentive effects separately focus only on 
financial incentives (Lazear, 2000; Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013; Guiteras and Jack, 2018). 
Moreover, their findings on relative importance of selection and incentive effects are mixed. For 
example, Lazear (2000) isolates worker selection and incentive effects of pay-for-performance 
using non-experimental panel data on job performance from a large manufacturing factory in the 
US. He shows evidence that the change to piece rate pay increases labor productivity by 44% with 
a half of it coming from the selection effect and the other half comes from the incentive effect. 
Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013) also identify the selection and incentive effects of wage 
incentives on the performance of politicians by exploiting policies that discontinuously change 
their salaries and limit political terms. They find that a higher wage attracts more educated 
candidates and leads to improved efficiency of public finance through the selection channel. By 
contrast, Guiteras and Jack (2018) find evidence from bean-sorting workers in rural Malawi that a 
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higher piece rate increases productivity only through the incentive effect channel, not through the 
worker selection channel. Our results are consistent with Lazear’s (2000) findings that both 
selection and incentive effects are important.  
 There are several studies focusing on the selection effects of work incentives. Dohmen 
and Falk (2011) show that sorting of workers largely explains higher labor productivity under a 
variable-payment scheme compared to a fixed-payment scheme in a laboratory experiment setting. 
Dal Bó et al. (2013) show that a higher wage attracts more qualified applicants without the cost of 
losing workers with strong public service motivation in a recruitment drive for Mexico’s public 
sector workers. Ashraf et al. (2016) similarly show that salient career incentives attract more 
productive workers without discouraging those with pro-social preferences from applying for a 
job in a recruitment drive for community health workers in Zambia. On the other hand, Deserranno 
(2018) finds that the expectation of a higher salary for a newly created health-promoter position 
discourages job applications from socially motivated candidates in Uganda. While the previous 
literature estimated selection effects of either financial incentives or career incentives, we estimate 
selection effects of career incentives evaluated against wage incentives.  
In addition, our study is related to another strand of the literature on incentive effects on 
job performance. The previous literature mainly focuses on financial incentives, to the best of our 
knowledge  (Gneezy and List, 2006; Shearer, 2004; Glewwe et al., 2010; Duflo et al., 2012; Fryer, 
2013; Ashraf et al., 2014). For example, Gneezy and List (2006) empirically test the gift exchange 
theory developed by Akerlof (1984) and show that workers exert more efforts when they receive 
a financial incentive (“gift”) from their employers. Shearer (2004) presents experimental evidence 
from Canadian tree planters that piece rates induce more effort than do fixed wages. By contrast, 
ours is the first of its kind to estimate career incentive effects.  
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Lastly, our study is related to the literature on internships. Most existing studies on 
internships are descriptive (Brooks et al., 1995; D’Abate et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2014). A rare 
exception is Nunley et al. (2016), which sends out fake résumés with randomly changed 
characteristics of applicants. They find that a résumé with internship experience receives 14% 
more callbacks from potential employers. However, a major limitation of the résumé audit study 
is lack of job performance data. Since career incentives in this study closely follow the structure 
of an (unpaid) internship program in the real world, this study offers experimental evidence on the 
effects of an internship on worker selection and job performance.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the research context 
and design. Section 3 describes the data and reports sample statistics. Section 4 presents the main 
results on labor productivity and discusses the findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Research Context and Design 
2.1. Research Context 
Malawi is one of the least developed countries in the world with GDP per capita in 2015 
of US$382 (World Bank, 2016). Among 20–29 years old males, 19.6% completed secondary 
school education according to the 2010 Malawi Demographic and Health Survey. Employment in 
the official sector is 11% and the median monthly income is US$28.8 (13,420 MWK) (National 
Statistical Office of Malawi, 2014).11 
AFF conducted a district-wide population census of Chimutu, a rural district located 
                                                     
11 MWK denotes Malawi Kwacha. As of January 1, 2015, US$1 was equivalent to 466 MWK. 
Throughout the paper, we use this as the currency exchange rate.  
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outside of the capital city of Malawi, in January 2015. Chimutu district consists of 52 catchment 
areas with about 94,000 people (around 24,000 households). AFF planned to complete a census 
within a month by hiring more than 130 enumerators. 
The enumerator position could be an attractive starting job for entry-level young workers 
because it offers a competitive salary and confers career-advancing incentives. For example, 
AFF’s many regular staff members were initially recruited as enumerators. The role of the census 
enumerators was to interview household heads to collect basic demographic, socioeconomic, and 
health information. During the census period, enumerators stayed at a house in the assigned 
catchment area rented by AFF. Since enumerators interviewed many residents in remote villages 
to collect a variety of personal and complex information, the job required both cognitive and 
interpersonal skills as well as physical endurance.  
Study participants to whom AFF offered the enumerator job were drawn from the sample 
of individuals who participated in the 2011 secondary school student survey in four districts in 
Malawi, including Chimutu. This 2011 survey was a baseline survey for AFF’s previous research 
program that randomly provided HIV/AIDS education, male circumcision, and financial support 
for female education in their catchment areas.12 Of the 536 males who participated in the 2011 
secondary school survey and graduated from secondary school in July 2014, AFF randomly 
selected 440 as target study participants. 362 study participants participated in the survey (i.e., the 
baseline survey of this study) without prior notice of a potential job offer. This sample recruitment 
approach allowed AFF to hire workers familiar with the census area. AFF considered only males 
                                                     
12 AFF’s catchment areas include the following four districts: Chimutu, Chitukula, Tsbango, and 
Kalumba. For details of AFF programs, see Data Appendix A.4. 
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due to security concerns in the field. In addition, AFF required secondary school graduation as 
proof of minimum cognitive skill requirements. 
Outside options for the enumerator job are other formal sector jobs, household farming, 
and repeating secondary school. For instance, at the time of the baseline survey, 4.7% of our study 
participants were working for pay in formal sectors, 4.3% were working for their family business 
(mainly farming), and 15.8% were attending vocational schools or colleges. About 60% were 
actively searching for jobs. 
Our sample recruitment strategy has two advantages. First, we observe the population of a 
young cohort whose members are potentially interested in a job opportunity in the local labor 
market, contrary to existing studies that observe only job applicants. This feature of our sampling 
allows our findings to have greater external validity by addressing the concern that individual 
characteristics of job applicants may be systematically different from those of non-applicants. For 
example, applicants could be more likely to possess the necessary skills, have better access to the 
information (at least for a job vacancy), and/or be less likely to be happy with their existing 
positions if they are currently working for another employer. Hence, the estimation of selection 
effects of any work incentives is inherently local to job applicants. Second, approaching those who 
just graduated from secondary school is relevant to an internship, which mainly targets young and 
entry-level workers.  
2.2. Experimental Design 
In this section, we explain the details of the experiment.  The discussion of a conceptual 
framework that motivates our experimental design and provides guidelines for the empirical 
analysis is in the Appendix. 
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2.2.1. Baseline survey and first-stage randomization 
  We describe the research stages in chronological order as shown in Table 1. As stated in 
the introduction, AFF invited 440 males who met the eligibility criteria (target study participants) 
for the baseline survey (Row A) and 362 (82.3%) participated in the baseline survey (Row B).13 
In addition, AFF invited study participants soon after the census was completed between April and 
June 2015 to measure time and risk preferences and rational decision-making ability.14  
To minimize unexpected interaction among workers with different incentives, first-stage 
randomization was performed in advance, and the baseline survey and training were also 
conducted separately for the Internship group and the Wage group. Study participants were given 
a job offer with detailed information on an enumerator position at the end of the baseline survey. 
It is noteworthy that a job offer was valid conditional on successful completion of the training. We 
refer to a conditional job offer simply as a job offer henceforth. Study participants were not aware 
of the other type of incentives when they received an offer. 
Of 220 target study participants assigned to the Wage group, 176 (80.0%) showed up for 
the baseline survey (Row B) and were given a short-term (verbal) job offer, each with a fixed 
salary of 10,000 MWK (US$21.5) for up to 30 days and performance pay of 500 MWK (US$1.1) 
                                                     
13 Those who did not participate in the survey were unreachable (45%), refused to participate 
(13%), or could not participate in the survey because they were at school (32%) or working (10%). 
14 This survey was conducted to measure time and risk preferences and rational decision-making 
ability after the census was completed under the assumption that these measures are not affected 
by our interventions. Out of 440 target study participants, 334 (76%) participated in the survey. 
We further discuss the data collected from these surveys in Section 3. 
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for every extra 8 households after the first 160 households.15 Of 220 target study participants 
assigned to the Internship group, 186 (84.5%) showed up for the baseline survey (Row B) and 
were given a (verbal) job offer with career incentives which consist of a recommendation letter 
and the prospect of working at AFF as a regular staff member.  
The base wage of 10,000 MWK (US$21.5) was competitive for young workers who had 
just graduated from secondary schools because the median monthly salary of secondary school 
graduates in 2013 was 12,000 MWK (US$25.8), according to the Malawi Labor Force Survey 
(NSO, 2014).16 AFF notified the Internship group that there would be a chance of a long-term 
contract, without specifying the precise probability, depending on job performance during the 
contract period and AFF’s job vacancies. Working as an intern without knowing the exact 
probability of hiring is close to the general internship setting. Lastly, one-time transportation 
support, on average about 1,500 MWK (US$3.2), was given to both Wage and Internship groups 
depending on the distance from the worker’s home and the dispatched village. 
2.2.2. Training 
Those who took the job offer were required to participate in a 1-week training program in 
                                                     
15 This rule gives an impression to enumerators that surveying 160 households is the de facto 
expectation of good performance. We acknowledge that this reference could increase or decrease 
average survey completion, but having a specific rule or a cut-off point about performance is 
unavoidable if an organization has to offer rule-based performance pay. 
16 The prospect of a regular entry-level staff position at AFF whose entry-level monthly salary is 
26,000 MWK (US$55.8) could be attractive. 
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January 2015. It was designed to equip trainees with the necessary skills and knowledge for the 
census work. The training outcomes were measured by a quiz score and the proportion of erroneous 
entries in a practice survey. To prevent interaction between participants with different incentives, 
the Internship group (the first week) and Wage group (the second week) joined the training 
sessions separately, but the instructors and the training materials were identical.  
Out of the 186 study participants in the Internship group, 74 (39.8%) participated in the 
training session, as did 74 out of 176 (42%) study participants in the Wage group (Row C). The 
job take-up rates (training participation rates) between the Internship group and the Wage group 
were not statistically different. However, 11 trainees from the Internship group were not hired 
because of low training performance, while no one failed from the Wage group (Row D). In total, 
137 enumerators were finally hired, 63 of which were from the Internship group and 74 from the 
Wage group (Row E). As a result, we do not observe job performance of 11 trainees from the 
Internship group who failed the training requirement.17  
2.2.3. Second-stage randomization 
Second-stage randomization was conducted during the training, and the randomization 
results were announced after the training completion but before the dispatch to the catchment area. 
The wage incentives were given to a randomly selected half of the Internship group. Similarly, the 
career incentives were given to a randomly selected half of the Wage group. The second-stage 
randomization was announced publicly. Therefore, both G1 and G2 enumerators learned about the 
additional wage incentives, and both G3 and G4 enumerators learned about the additional career 
incentives. AFF staff explained to enumerators that they would distribute additional incentives in 
                                                     
17 We discuss this further in footnote 36. 
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a random manner due to budget constraints. No enumerators refused to accept the additional 
incentives, which implies that the composition of worker characteristics between G1 and G2 and 
between G3 and G4 remains the same.  
Right after the second-stage randomization, AFF supervisors and enumerators had a one-
on-one session to explain the details of the contract, and the enumerators signed the employment 
contract as shown in Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3.18 To illustrate, the employment contract of G1 
explicitly states that enumerators will not be given any financial compensation and will be 
provided with a recommendation letter and a potential job opportunity based on their performance.  
2.2.4 Census and post-enumeration survey  
Enumerators were dispatched to 52 catchment areas in January 2015. They were randomly 
assigned to catchment areas stratified by population and land size, and worked independently. 
Enumerators in the same catchment area have the same incentives to prevent unexpected peer 
effects. In addition, enumerators were not assigned to areas from which they originally came, as 
locality could affect their performance. The census survey took about 25 minutes on average to 
interview a household head. Enumerators were expected to survey at least eight households per 
day. In total, enumerators surveyed 21,561 households during the contract period.  
AFF supervisor teams, which consisted of two supervisors per team, visited enumerators 
to monitor and guide enumeration work on randomly selected dates without prior notice. 
Supervisors are AFF’s regular staff members, each with at least 3 years of experience conducting 
field surveys. AFF randomly assigned five supervisor teams to 52 catchment areas for their visits. 
                                                     
18 Through the one-on-one meeting, AFF explained to G4 enumerators that their position would 
be a one-time employment opportunity even though it was not explicitly mentioned in the contract.  
00854
9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS.
rest
by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the
  Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  16 
Most enumerators met a supervisor team at least once during the census period; 37% of the 
enumerators met supervisors twice and the remaining 60% met supervisors once. Enumerators 
were aware of supervisor visits but did not know the exact date. Supervisors joined each 
enumerator for interviews of about three households, addressed common errors, and provided 
overall comments at the end of the visit. 
Shortly after the completion of the census, AFF conducted a post enumeration survey (PES) 
to correct errors found in the original census interview, find omitted households, and measure 
subjective performance evaluation (SPE) by revisiting all households in Chimutu. AFF announced 
a PES plan to evaluate the performance before the field dispatch to prevent enumerators from 
outright cheating or fabricating census interview sheets.19 
As stated in the employment contract, AFF provided recommendation letters to the 
enumerators with career incentives (G1, G2, and G3) in May 2015. The recommendation letter 
was signed jointly by the director of AFF and the head of the Chimutu district. The letter specified 
the job description of an enumerator and his relative job performance.20  
                                                     
19 Hiring enumerators as regular staff members required the calculation of job performance after 
the completion of the census, which can take at least two months. Meanwhile, AFF hired 43 PES 
enumerators among 98 census enumerators with career incentives (G1, G2, and G3) on a 
temporary basis (2–3 months) through a simple performance evaluation based on SPE by 
supervisors and error rates measured from five randomly selected surveys.  
20 If an enumerator has higher job performance than the average, the letter specifies a very strong 
recommendation. If an enumerator has performance below the average, the letter specifies a 
somewhat lukewarm recommendation. 
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3. Data  
We use data from various sources, including baseline and follow-up surveys, 
administrative data on training and job performance, and the Chimutu population census. First, we 
use data from the 2011 secondary school student survey. It contains rich information on a variety 
of areas covering demographics, socioeconomic status, health, and cognitive ability. Second, we 
use data from the 2014 baseline survey, which collects information on demographics, education, 
employment history, cognitive abilities, non-cognitive traits, and HIV/AIDS related outcomes. 
We measure cognitive ability in two distinct ways. The first measure is Math and English 
scores of the 2014 Malawi School Certificate of Education (MSCE) test, which are easily 
observable in the local labor market.21 The second measure is the scores of Raven’s matrices test 
and the verbal and clerical ability tests of the O*NET, which are difficult to observe for potential 
employers. Data Appendix A.1 provides the definitions of these cognitive ability measures.  
Non-cognitive traits include self-esteem, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and the 
Big Five personality test (extraversion, openness, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and 
neuroticism). The additional baseline survey conducted in April–June 2015 collected data on risk 
and time preferences and rational decision-making ability using the tests recently developed by 
                                                     
21 MSCE is an official test that all Malawian students must take to graduate from secondary school. 
AFF had access to the administrative MSCE score data via the cooperation of the Ministry of 
Education of the Republic of Malawi. We use Math and English test scores only because they are 
mandatory subjects of the MSCE test. 
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Choi et al (2014).22  
Training outcomes are measured by a quiz score and the proportion of erroneous entries in 
a practice survey.23 The quiz tested specific knowledge on the census details. It consists of 12 
questions, a mixture of open-ended and true/false type questions. The full text of the quiz is 
presented in Figure A.4.  
Main job performance measures during the census are survey quantity and quality. Survey 
quantity is measured by the number of households surveyed by each enumerator per day. Survey 
quality is measured by the proportion of systematically inconsistent or incorrect entries in the 
                                                     
22 As explained in Subsection 2.2.1, risk and time preferences, and rational decision-making ability 
were measured after the census was completed. We included these measures in the randomization 
balance test under the assumption that these traits were not affected by our experiment. Data 
Appendix A.1 provides the details of how we measure them.  
23 The purpose of the practice survey was to practice interview skills before enumerators were 
dispatched to the field. The practice survey performance was evaluated as follows: First, we 
randomly matched two trainees. Each trainee in a randomly assigned pair received a pre-filled 
census questionnaire sheet and a blank survey questionnaire sheet. Then, one trainee interviewed 
the other matched trainee in the same pair and the latter trainee responded based on the assigned 
survey sheet. There were two different types of pre-filled questionnaire sheets with different 
hypothetical household information. Thus, trainees in the same pair acted as if they were two 
different households. Each trainee in every pair conducted this practice survey by changing roles. 
After conducting practice survey sessions, supervisors collected the survey sheets and calculated 
the error rate.  
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census questionnaire specific to each household surveyed. For example, if a respondent has a child, 
the information about her child should be filled in. If not, it is counted as an error. Data Appendix 
A.2 provides the details about how we calculate the survey error rate. We also use subjective 
performance evaluations (SPE) measured by census respondents because we expect enumerators 
to give good impressions to community members as an NGO worker that serves local communities. 
During the PES, census respondents were asked to evaluate how carefully the enumerator had 
explained the questions.24 In addition, after the completion of the census, 12 supervisors jointly 
evaluated the work attitude of each enumerator (SPEs measured by AFF supervisors).25  
Lastly, census data were used to calculate the average characteristics of the catchment area 
so that we can use them as the control vector in the main regression analysis. 26 
                                                     
24 The question asked was “Whenever you were confused or could not understand the meaning of 
any question, did the enumerator carefully explain the meaning of the questions to you?”. We 
analyze SPE by census respondents only when the census respondent and the PES respondent were 
identical. The probabilities that an original census respondent was a PES respondent are 77%, 77%, 
83%, and 82% for G1, G2, G3, and G4, respectively. These rates are significantly different. Hence, 
the interpretation of the SPE analysis by respondents should be taken with caution. 
25 We asked a group of supervisors to evaluate general work attitude of enumerators. Enumerators 
were scored on a scale of 1 to 3.  
26 Regarding catchment area size, we could not acquire information on the exact land size of each 
catchment area. However, we had an unofficial, categorical measure of land size ranging from 1 
(smallest) to 10 (largest), jointly determined by AFF supervisors who have worked in the Chimutu 
district for five years or longer. 
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Columns (2) and (3) of Table A.2 present the baseline characteristics of the Internship and  
Wage groups, respectively. The results of the first- and second-stage randomization balance are 
presented in Columns (4), (5) and (6). Panel A represents individual baseline characteristics of 
study participants. Study participants are about 20 years old and only 9% work in the official sector 
reflecting weak labor demand in Malawi.27 Data Appendix A.1 provides the specific definition of 
the variables presented in Panel A. Panel B represents the catchment area characteristics where 
enumerators were dispatched. The results confirm that the study groups are well balanced: the 
proportion of statistically significant mean difference at the 10% significance level is 2 out of 28 
(7.1%) in Column (4), 3 out 28 (10.7%) in Column (5), and 4 out of 28 (14.3%) in Column (6).  
We also examine whether the baseline survey participants and non-participants are 
systematically different. Table A.3 shows that they are not statistically different from each other 
in most dimensions except for the household asset score. In addition, Table A.4 shows no 
systematic differences across enumerators assigned to each supervisor team, which confirms that 
the supervisor team randomization went well.  
4. Main Results 
4.1. Job Offer Take-up  
Column (1) of Table 2 shows that the job offer take-up rates between the Internship and 
Wage groups are not statistically different. We test multidimensional sorting discussed in Dohmen 
                                                     
27 The employment rate of baseline survey non-participants is similar. We reached non-
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and Falk (2011) by exploring whether career and wage incentives attract those with different 
observable characteristics. Columns (2) to (18) of Table 2 show the regression results of the 
following equation:  
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝜆 ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝜑 ∙ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖        (1) 
where 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖  is a binary indicator that equals 1 if individual i accepted a job offer, and 0 
otherwise. 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 is a binary indicator if individual i belongs to the Internship group and the 
omitted category is the Wage group. 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑡𝑖 is an individual characteristic variable that we evaluate 
one by one. 𝜖𝑖 is an error term. We test whether career incentives attract workers differently over 
a variety of individual characteristics including demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, 
cognitive ability index, and non-cognitive traits.  
Our coefficient of interest is 𝜑, which captures differential take-up of a job offer between 
the Internship group and the Wage group by individual traits. We find that none of the estimates 
of φ across individual traits is statistically significant at the 5% level.28 These findings imply that 
observable characteristics are not likely to predict self-selection.  
Table A.5 provides additional evidence on self-selection by comparing the observable 
                                                     
28 There might be concern about statistical power due to relatively small sample size (N=362). 
However, for most variables we are able to detect 15% differences between the two groups. For 
example, Column 2 of Table 2 shows we are able to detect age difference between the two groups 
that is bigger than 0.07 (=0.037*1.96) years, which is a 0.36% change (=(0.07/20.4)*100). 
Nonetheless, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that we are unable to detect small differences 
between the two groups. Therefore, the results should be interpreted with this caveat.  
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characteristics of job offer takers between the Internship group and the Wage group. The results 
in Table A.5 confirm the results in Table 2 that the two groups are not systematically different in 
terms of both statistical and economic significance.29  
The absence of systematic differences in observable characteristics does not necessarily 
mean that unobservable characteristics, training outcomes, and job performance would be the same 
if some of the unobservable characteristics were to affect training outcomes and job performance.  
4.2. Training Outcomes 
Even though we do not find any differences in observable characteristics between job 
takers of the two groups, we might find a difference in training outcomes if career and wage 
incentives attract people with different unobservable characteristics. Panel A of Figure A.5 
displays the kernel density estimates of the training outcomes measured by the quiz score and the 
practice survey error rate. Table 3 shows the corresponding results from the following specification: 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 · 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖    (2) 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 is the training outcomes such as practice survey error rate and quiz score for 
individual i. For the practice survey error rate regression, we control for a practice survey type and 
                                                     
29 We acknowledge that study participants could have responded to the self-reported non-cognitive 
tests in a way that they believed to be desirable from the perspective of a potential employer, even 
though they were not aware of the possibility of a job offer at the time of the baseline survey. This 
is consistent with the real world in which job seekers are not able to manipulate test scores 
(cognitive ability) in a pre-employment test but might try to respond to a personality test in a way 
in which they have a desirable non-cognitive skill.  
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pair–fixed effect in the regression.30 
Panel A of Figure A.5 shows that the Wage group performs better than the Internship group 
in terms of both quiz score and practice survey error rate. Panel A of Table 3 provides 
corresponding results from the regression. It confirms that the quiz score of the Internship group 
trainees is 2.0 points (23.8%) lower than that of the Wage group trainees as shown in Column (1). 
Similarly, the survey error rate is 10.4 percentage points (38.2%) higher among the Internship 
group trainees than that among the Wage group trainees as shown in Column (3). 
At the end of the training, AFF disqualified 11 trainees who did not meet the minimum 
qualification requirement. As the abovementioned regression results indicate, the Internship group 
performed worse than the Wage group did. Thus, all dropouts (11 trainees) came from the 
Internship group only. Panel B of Table 3 presents the training outcomes of enumerators 
dispatched to the field by excluding the 11 training failures. The regression results between the 
two panels are qualitatively similar, but the magnitude of the coefficient estimates is larger in Panel 
A than in Panel B, because those who failed training are all from the Internship group. 
The specification used in Columns (2) and (5) is to test whether individual observable 
characteristics can explain the differences in the training outcomes between the two groups. The 
individual observable characteristics include age, household asset score, cognitive ability index, 
and non-cognitive traits, such as self-esteem, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and Big 5 
personality scales. We find similar coefficient estimates between Columns (1) and (2). For 
                                                     
30 All regressions include number of siblings, which is not balanced in the baseline, and 
eligibility for AFF’s past interventions as a control vector. When analyzing the practice survey 
error rate, we additionally include survey pair fixed effect.   
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example, observable characteristics explain only 2.5% (=(2.01-1.96)/2.01) of the difference in quiz 
score. In the case of the practice survey error rate, controlling for individual characteristics in 
Column (5) makes coefficient estimates statistically insignificant and larger. These findings imply 
that observable characteristics are somewhat limited in explaining the difference in the training 
outcomes.  
In summary, we find that those attracted by a job offer with wage incentives outperformed 
those attracted by a job offer with career incentives in the training. This difference could be caused 
by workers with different characteristics selecting into different work incentives, thereby creating 
the difference in the training outcomes (selection effect). 
However, there are several reasons why the observed difference in training performance 
could be different from the true selection effect. For instance, those in the Internship group have 
an incentive to exert more effort than the Wage group due to the future job prospect of the career 
incentives. That is, in the absence of such an effect, the difference in training performance due to 
selection could be larger than the observed difference in training performance. On the other hand, 
the difference in training performance due to selection could be smaller if there was a learning-by-
doing effect for training instructors. Instructors could deliver lectures more efficiently in the 
second session (for the Wage group) than in the first session (for the Internship group). Therefore, 
the analysis of the training results should be interpreted with caution due to these possibilities that 
can potentially bias the selection effect 
4.3. Selection effect of career incentives on labor productivity  
In this subsection, we examine the selection effect of career incentives evaluated against 
wage incentives on job performance. As previously discussed, G2 and G3 have the same incentives 
at work, but the channels by which they were recruited are different. Therefore, we interpret that 
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differences in performance are driven by the selection effect. 
 Our identifying assumption is that G2 and G3 enumerators perceive their work incentives 
identical at work even though the sequences by which career and wage incentives were presented 
are different. The different sequence could form different perceived valuation of the incentives 
that affect enumerators’ feelings leading to different levels of work efforts. As a result, our 
estimates of the selection effect would be biased as Abeler et al. (2011) discussed. However, we 
argue this is unlikely. If there were such a difference in feelings, we expect that differences in job 
performance would become smaller over time because the difference in feelings might diminish 
with time. Figure A.6 shows that the difference in job performance is fairly constant over time.31  
 Panel B of Figure A.5 suggests that G2 has higher labor productivity than G3 in terms of 
survey quality and quantity. This finding is surprising because the Wage group had better training 
outcomes than the Internship group did. We test this graphical evidence formally by estimating 
the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 · 𝐺2𝑗 + 𝛾 · 𝐻𝑖𝑘 + 𝜑 · 𝑍𝑘 + 𝑉𝑙𝑡 + 𝜎𝑡 +𝜓𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑡   (3) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑡 is job performance measured in the survey collected from household i by enumerator 
j whose supervisor is l, in catchment area k, surveyed on the t-th work day. 𝐺2𝑗  is 1 if enumerator 
j belongs to G2 and 0 if he belongs to G3. 𝐻𝑖𝑘 is a vector of respondents’ household characteristics 
                                                     
31 The different sequence could still generate bias if those recruited with career incentives might 
misunderstand the addition of wage incentives as a reward for good performance during training, 
while those recruited with wage incentives might misunderstand the addition of career incentives 
as a windfall gain, not a reward. However, this is also unlikely because we clearly indicated that 
the additional provision of incentives in the second stage was randomly determined. 
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and 𝑍𝑘 is a vector of catchment area characteristics.
32 𝑉𝑙𝑡 is the supervisor team-specific post-visit 
effect and 𝜎𝑡 is the survey date fixed effect.
33 Standard errors are clustered at the catchment area 
level. For dependent variables, we use survey quality measured by the survey error rate (𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡𝑙) 
and survey quantity measured by the number of surveys per day (𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑦𝑗𝑘𝑡𝑙). 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the regression results from equation (3). We find that G2 
outperforms G3 in two main measures of job performance, even though G3 outperforms G2 during 
the training. The error rate is 2.2 percentage points (28.6%) lower in G2 than G3, as shown in 
Column (1). The survey quantity of G2 is higher than that of G3 by 1.39 households per day 
(13.0%), as shown in Column (4).  
To assess how much observable individual characteristics and training performance can 
explain the selection effect estimated in Columns (1) and (4), we additionally control for 
enumerator characteristics such as demographic and socioeconomic status, cognitive ability 
(MSCE scores and Raven’s matrices/O*NET scores), and non-cognitive traits in Columns (2) and 
(5) as well as training performance in Columns (3) and (6). As shown in Columns (2) and (5), 
observable individual characteristics of enumerators are limited in explaining the estimated 
selection effect. On survey quality, the inclusion of observed individual characteristics does not 
explain the estimated selection effect of career incentives at all. It explains survey quantity only 
                                                     
32 Respondent's household characteristics include the fixed effect for family size. Catchment area 
characteristics include the total number of households, size of the catchment area, asset score, birth 
rate, malaria incidence, rate of birth with the assistance of a health professional, and death rate. 
33  𝑉𝑙𝑡 = 𝜂0 + 𝜂1𝑙𝐼(𝑡 > 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡) + 𝜂2𝑙𝐼(𝑡 > 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑)  where First and Second are the dates of 
supervisor team l’s first and second visits, respectively, to enumerator j.  
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by 7.2% (=(1.39-1.29)/1.39). Additionally controlling for training performance also remains 
limited in explaining the selection effects. 
We present the selection effect on SPEs in Table A.6. G2 has a 67.9% higher SPE score 
by survey respondents than G3, as shown in Column (1). Adding enumerator characteristics 
explains only 7.0% of the selection effect on SPE by respondents. This result is consistent with the 
fact that the observable characteristics of job takers between the Internship group and the Wage 
group are not different. Lastly, we find that the SPE score by supervisors is higher in G3 than in 
G2 (Column (4)), but it is not statistically significant at the 5% level. We do not control for 𝜎𝑡 and 
𝑉𝑙𝑡 when we analyze SPE score by supervisors because it does not vary over time and catchment 
area. 
In Table A.7, we report the results that decompose the main outcomes. To understand 
where survey errors come from, we decompose errors into incorrectly entered entries (e.g., filling 
in 179 for a person’s age) and incorrectly missing entries (e.g., a child is present in the household 
but his/her age is missing). To better understand how survey quantity changes, we conduct 
regression analyses on three time-use variables such as total work hours per day, average survey 
time per household, and intermission time between surveys.34 Column (3) in Panel A indicates that 
                                                     
34 Work hours per day are the difference between the beginning time of the first survey and the 
end time of the last survey of the day. Intermission time is defined as the difference between the 
beginning time of a survey and the end time of the previous survey. The survey beginning and end 
times were recorded as a part of the census questionnaire. However, there was a sizable number of 
missing values, so we imputed those missing values (See Data Appendix A.3). The results remain 
similar even if we do not use the observations with imputed time values.  
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the selection effect of career incentives on survey quality reported in Table 4 is mostly driven by 
the decrease in incorrectly missing entries. In addition, we find that the selection effect of career 
incentives on survey quantity comes from longer work hours, shorter survey time per household, 
and shorter intermission time as shown in Columns (5)-(10) of Table A.7. However, these 
coefficient estimates are not precisely estimated. We find that observable enumerator 
characteristics and training performance do not explain differences between G2 and G3 much. 
Then, why do G2 enumerators outperform G3 enumerators in actual job performance, 
while the Wage group outperforms the Internship group during training? One possible explanation 
is that different skill sets are required in each setting. The test taken during the training was in a 
classroom setting, while job performance resulted from actual interactions with respondents in the 
field. It is plausible that enumerators selected through career incentives have comparative 
advantages in on-the-job performance but not in tests in a classroom setting. A critical 
characteristic of an enumerator is the skill to ask strangers sensitive questions about their 
households. This kind of skill might not be captured easily in a test taken in a laboratory setting.35,36 
                                                     
35 Alternatively, it is possible that the Internship group initially had lower performance in the 
training but caught up with the Wage group later in the field owing to a steeper learning curve. 
However, this is less likely, as we find no evidence of performance catch-up. Job performance 
between the Internship and Wage groups remained constant over the study period (see Figure A.6 
for the daily performance trend). It is also possible that screening out 11 trainees in the Internship 
group served as a reminder or a credible threat to those with career incentives that only some of 
them would be hired as regular workers in AFF, causing G2 to work harder than G3. 
36 All 11 trainees who were dropped were from the Internship group. Therefore, if the labor 
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4.4. Incentive effects of work incentives on labor productivity 
To measure causal impacts of career incentives on labor productivity, we compare job performance 
of enumerators who receive both wage and career incentives (G3) and that of enumerators with 
wage incentives only (G4). Similarly, we measure causal impacts of wage incentives by comparing 
job performance between enumerators with only career incentives (G1) and enumerators with both 
career and wage incentives (G2). We estimate incentive effects of wage and career incentives 
among job takers of the Internship and Wage groups, respectively; therefore, these incentive 
effects are not directly comparable. Panels B and C of Table 4 report the incentive effects of career 
and wage incentives on job performance estimated among the Wage and Internship groups, 
respectively. Panels C and D in Figure A.5 present the corresponding graphical evidence.  
Our conceptual framework predicts that the additional provision of career incentives would 
motivate enumerators to exert more effort and improve job performance. However, in Panel B of 
Table 4, we find no such evidence in main labor productivity outcomes. However, column (4) of 
                                                     
productivity of the dropouts were lower than that of the hired enumerators, the performance-
improving selection effects would be overestimated. However, we do not consider that any 
particular adjustment is necessary in the main analysis because screening out trainees who did not 
meet the minimum requirement is a regular business practice. Nevertheless, we re-estimate 
equation (3) after dropping 11 trainees with the lowest training scores from the Wage group (six 
from G3 and five from G4). Panel A of Table A.8 shows that the results for the selection effects 
remain mostly robust; the size of the coefficients for the selection effect on survey quality becomes 
smaller, while that for survey quantity becomes larger. We find similar results on incentive effects 
(Panels B and C) and combined effects (Panel D). 
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Table A.6 shows that SPE measured by supervisors significantly increases by 51.5%. In summary, 
career incentives given to existing workers hired through the wage incentive channel do not 
improve labor productivity, but they induce enumerators to have better evaluation from supervisors. 
We speculate that the effort level of the Wage group enumerators was already high, and thus it is 
difficult for them to improve work performance at least in the short run. They rather exerted effort 
in building their relationships with supervisors.37 
There might be a concern that, despite high frequency data, the relatively small number of 
enumerators allows for the detection of only relatively large effects and makes it difficult to 
interpret null results. Indeed, we are somewhat underpowered in the regression analysis of Panel 
B of Table 4 in the sense that the size of the standard errors is not small enough to capture the 
small effect (if any) of the work incentives. To illustrate, we are able to capture the impacts of 
career incentive on survey quality and quantity only if the change is greater than 16.7% 
                                                     
37 Another possibility is that career incentives might not be very appealing to enumerators recruited 
through wage incentives conditional on self-selection. For example, enumerators might not have 
needed a job for a longer period. Alternatively, the marginal effects of career incentives in the 
second stage could be small, because enumerators had already received wage incentives in the first 
stage. However, this possibility does not explain an increase in SPE by supervisors. Lastly, there 
exists concern that the differences in performance could be driven by the decrease in control group 
productivity due to disappointment at not receiving the second-stage incentives. However, this 
possibility is less likely because this psychological mechanism, if present, would decline over time 
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(=0.007×1.96/0.082) and 13.0% (=0.763×1.96/11.5), respectively.  
Panel C of Table 4 shows that wage incentives, additionally given to the Internship group 
enumerators, improve job performance. We find that survey errors decrease by 3.8 percentage 
points (a 50.1% decrease) in Column (1) without statistically significant changes in survey quantity 
(Column (5)) and SPEs (Panel C of Table A.6). Panel C of Table A.7 shows that the decrease in 
the survey error rate is explained mostly by a decrease in illogical missing entries, as shown in 
Column (3).38 This finding is consistent with the gift exchange model of the efficiency wage theory 
formulated by Akerlof (1984). In the model, a worker exerts more efforts upon receiving a gift 
from an employer that exceeds the minimum level of compensation for the minimum level of effort. 
We also acknowledge that a part of the productivity improvements in G2 (evaluated against G1) 
might not be completely due to the gift exchange motive because the wage incentives include a 
performance bonus component.  
Panel D of Table 4, which compares G1 versus G4, resembles the combined effects of 
selection and incentive effects on productivity in that participants were attracted to accept a job 
offer via different incentives and the incentives at work also remained different. It is noteworthy 
that the combined effects of career incentives (Panel D) are not necessarily a simple sum of the 
selection effect (Panel A) and incentive effect (Panel B), because of potential interaction between 
                                                     
38 One might wonder that the G1 enumerators who have career incentives only performed poorly 
due to lack of money for meals in the field. To minimize this possibility, AFF informed all 
enumerators in advance that it would be difficult to find a shop or restaurant in the field, and 
encouraged them to bring enough of their own food during the work period. AFF ensured that the 
enumerators were able to use the kitchen for cooking at the pre-arranged housing during the census. 
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selection and incentive effects. In addition, the study sample used in Panel D of Table 4 is different 
from that in Panels A and B. We find no significant difference in the combined effects between 
G1 and G4 in the main productivity outcomes, implying the importance of separating selection 
and incentive effects. However, we find that G1 enumerators have significantly better SPE by 
supervisors than G4 enumerators do (Panel D of Table A.6), which is consistent with the fact that 
career incentives causally improve SPE by supervisors in Panel B.  
5. Conclusion 
This study analyzes how career and wage incentives affect labor productivity through a 
two-stage randomized controlled trial in the context of a recruitment drive for census enumerators 
in Malawi. Even though career and wage incentives are the most common types of work incentives, 
no study has considered these incentives in the same setting, to the best of our knowledge.  
We find that career incentives of an internship significantly improve labor productivity 
through the self-selection of workers: The Internship group (those attracted by career incentives) 
outperformed the Wage group (those attracted by wage incentives) at work, even though the Wage 
group was better than the Internship group during the training. Observable individual 
characteristics, including training outcomes, are limited in explaining the difference in labor 
productivity. The fact that neither observable characteristics nor training outcomes predict actual 
job performance implies that screening via observable characteristics is imperfect, particularly 
when hiring entry-level workers who have no track record of past job history or credentials to 
verify their unobserved productivity. Furthermore, these findings highlight the importance of a 
recruitment strategy in attracting workers with strong unobservable skills via self-selection (e.g., 
an internship).  
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Regarding the career incentive effect, we find no positive evidence for the career incentive 
effects on labor productivity conditional on selection except for the SPE by supervisors. Our 
findings suggest that career incentives are effective in improving labor productivity mainly 
through the selection effect channel. Lastly, we find that additional financial incentives can be an 
effective means to improve labor productivity (e.g., survey quality) for those recruited by career 
incentives. As a result, labor productivity is highest in G2, who were recruited by career incentives 
and received additional wage incentive. 
We show how work incentives affect labor productivity among entry-level workers in 
Malawi. Therefore, our setting is closest to situations in which firms hire entry-level workers in 
developing countries whose productivity is not easily observable and worker characteristics are 
similar due to the similarity in contexts. Our analysis has implications for settings in which 
employers have difficulties screening productive workers with no or short employment history and 
are looking for effective means to motivate existing workers. 
There are limitations to our study. First, we acknowledge that the approach by which we 
estimate the incentive effects might not perfectly characterize the real world. In the real world, 
workers might not always receive additional incentives without prior notice. Second, the length of 
the job we study is relatively short-term. As such, we cannot study whether the estimated selection 
and incentive effects of career and wage incentives remain constant over longer periods. The short-
term nature of our study also limits the analysis of the effects of work incentives on retention. 
Third, we do not directly observe the individual’s perception of the value of work incentives. In 
addition, we do not measure how career and wage incentives change workers’ belief about the 
probability of retention by AFF. Hence, we do not know whether the selection effect of career 
incentives operates through the expectation of a job prospect at AFF or a potentially favorable 
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recommendation letter. Fourth, the non-cognitive traits used in this study are self-reported 
psychometric scales measured based on a paper test. It would be interesting to know whether such 
paper-based and self-reported non-cognitive traits are highly correlated with non-cognitive traits 
measured in other settings. Fifth, the relatively small number of enumerators may prevent us from 
interpreting relatively small and insignificant effects, especially in estimating the career incentive 
effects. However, most major outcomes (selection effects and wage incentives effects) are large 
enough to detect their effects.  
The difficulty in effective screening of job applicants and lack of motivation among 
existing workers are key drivers of low labor productivity, particularly in developing countries. A 
better understanding of selection and incentive effects of work incentives would allow employers 
to design optimal employment strategies. Based on our findings, we argue that active adoption of 
career incentives in the workplace as a hiring strategy could be an effective means to increase labor 
productivity of an organization hiring entry-level workers.  
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Figure 1: Experimental Design  
 
Notes: Upper case N indicates the number of participants in each stage. Lower case n indicates the number of surveys conducted by 
census enumerators  
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Table 1 Experiment Stages 
Stage of experiment 
Number of individuals  






















A Target study subjects 
2011 
Dec 
220 220 - 440 
B  
 Study participants 
(baseline survey participants) 
2014 
Dec 
186 (84.1%) 176 (80.0%) .265 362 
C  Trainees 2015 
Jan 
74 (39.8%) 74 (42.0%) .663 148 
D Trainees who failed training 11 0 - 11 
E  Enumerators 2015 63 (33.9%) 74 (42.0%) - 137 
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Jan-Feb 33 30 35 39 
F Number of surveys 4,448 5,298 5,836 5,939 - 21,521 
Notes: The proportions of individuals remaining over experiment stages are in parentheses. The number of participants in the stage B is 
divided by the number of participants in the stage A, and the number of participants in the stages C and E are divided by the number of 
participants in the stage B. 
 
 























* -.068* -.107 -.024** -.012 -.019 -.058* 
 (.030) (.019) (.040) (.136) (.010) (.108) (.136) (.032) 
Internship 
group 
-.024 -.323 -.029 -.023 -.025 -.321 .521 .733 -.297* 
(.052) (.747) (.131) (.085) (.055) (.278) (.491) (.520) (.173) 
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Internship 
group 
 (.037) (.028) (.054) (.180) (.014) (.157) (.182) (.046) 
Constant 
.481*** -.372 .326*** .558*** .491*** .931*** .517 .537 .683*** 
(.055) (.613) (.094) (.073) (.057) (.205) (.336) (.387) (.126) 
Observations 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 361 358 
R-squared .018 .046 .036 .036 .021 .034 .027 .031 .027 





























-.001 .046* .011 -.001 .196 .288 -.019 -.051 -.140*** 
(.027) (.026) (.027) (.027) (.284) (.498) (.274) (.040) (.053) 
Internship 
group 
.025 .251 .145 .041 -.096 .388 -.228 -.028 -.035 
(.196) (.216) (.195) (.187) (.158) (.413) (.305) (.052) (.052) 
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-.010 -.049 -.033 -.013 .199 -.644 .257 -.033 -.050 
(.037) (.037) (.037) (.035) (.384) (.640) (.363) (.056) (.071) 
Constant 
.486*** .223 .426*** .485*** .407*** .299 .502** .483*** .496*** 
(.148) (.152) (.148) (.148) (.130) (.324) (.234) (.055) (.053) 
Observations 362 361 360 362 334 335 334 362 362 
R-squared .019 .026 .020 0.019 .024 .019 .019 0.033 .069 
Mean (SD) 5.11(1.39) 5.68(1.35) 5.07(1.45) 5.36(1.35) .396(.144) .635(.083) .826(.149) -.013(.857) .037(.658) 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Asset score is the sum of items owned out of improved toilet, refrigerator, and bicycle. See Data Appendix A.1 for the definitions of 
MSCE score, Raven and O*NET score, and non-cognitive trait variables. 
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Table 3: Training Performance 
Dependent variable 
Quiz score Practice survey error rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: 148 Trainee Sample      
Internship group 
-2.01*** -1.96*** .104*** .089*** .323 
(.344) (.303) (.026) (.029) (.206) 
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 
R-squared .228 .534 .114 .239 .811 
Wage Group Mean (SD) 8.43 (1.82) .272 (.142) 
Panel B: 137 Enumerator Sample       
Internship group 
-1.44*** -1.47*** .094*** .080*** .302 
(.329) (.286) (.028) (.030) (.210) 
Observations 137 137 137 137 137 
R-squared .163 .511 .099 .243 .862 
Wage Group Mean (SD) 8.43 (1.82) .272 (.142) 
Individual characteristics No YES No No YES 
Practice survey pair FE No No No YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote the significance 
level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All specifications (columns 1-5) include the number of 
siblings and binary indicators for previous AFF programs. The practice survey error rate 
regression includes a binary indicator for the survey questionnaire type. Columns 2, 4, and 5 
include age, asset score, MSCE score, Raven and O*NET score, and a set of non-cognitive traits 
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(self-esteem, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and Big 5 personality items). Column 5 includes 
dummies for each trainee pair who conducted the practice survey with each other. 
 
 




Survey quantity  
(number of surveys per day) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Selection effect (G2 vs G3)       
G2 
-.022** -.023** -.023** 1.39** 1.29** 1.09* 
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.610) (.542) (.611) 
Observations 11,130 11,130 11,130 1,003 1,003 1,003 
R-squared .162 .307 .308 .145 .170 .180 
 Mean (SD) of G3 .077 (.078) 10.7 (5.45) 
Panel B: Incentive effect of career incentives (G3 vs. G4)     
G3 
.007 .006 .006 -.763 -1.14* -1.14* 
(.009) (.010) (.010) (.681) (.628) (.613) 
Observations 11,775 11,775 11,775 1,063 1,063 1,063 
R-squared .189 .269 .276 .152 .195 .199 
 Mean (SD) of G4 .082 (074) 11.5 (6.36) 
Panel C: Incentive effect of wage (G1 vs. G2)         
G2 
-.038** -.022** -.019* 1.05 .644 .247 
(.016) (.010) (.010) (.879) (.941) (.999) 
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Observations 9,779 9,779 9,779 914 914 914 
R-squared .178 .357 .358 .203 .232 .242 
 Mean (SD) of G1 .075 (.068) 9.84 (5.19) 
Panel D: Combined effect (G1 vs. G4)     
G1 
-.001 -.003 -.005 -1.41 -.732 -.259 
(.015) (.013) (.013) (1.31) (1.18) (1.06) 
Observations 10,424 10,424 10,424 974 974 974 
R-squared .194 .276 .277 .157 .232 .235 
 Mean (SD) of G4 .082 (074) 11.5 (6.36) 
Individual 
characteristics 
NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Training performance NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the catchment area level are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All specifications 
(columns 1−6) include the number of siblings, catchment area characteristics, supervisor team-
specific post-visit variables, survey date-fixed effect, and binary indicator variables for previous 
AFF programs. Catchment area characteristics include the total number of households, catchment 
area size, family size, asset score, number of births in the last 3 years, incidence of malaria among 
children under 3, and deaths in the last 12 months. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 include age, asset score, 
MSCE score, Raven and O*NET score, and a set of non-cognitive traits (self-esteem, intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation, and Big 5 personality items). Columns 3 and 6 additionally include the two 
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